This paper examines strategic trade and joint welfare maximizing incentives towards investment in the quality of exports by an LDC and a developed country. Firms first compete in qualities and then export to an imperfectly competitive, third country market. Under Bertrand competition, unilateral policy involves an investment subsidy by the low-quality LDC and an investment tax by the developed country, whereas jointly optimal policy calls for the reverse so as to reduce price competition by increasing product differentiation. Under Cournot competition, unilateral policy is also reversed from the Bertrand outcome, but jointly optimal policy involves a tax in both countries.
Introduction
The availability of a greater variety of products with increasing levels of world trade has emphasised the importance of non-price competition for success in exporting. At one extreme, there is Japan with its demanding consumers and quality oriented production culture and, at the other, there is the emergence of lower quality, but cost competitive producers among the newly industrialized countries (NICs). Thus success for a company can often involve the careful positioning of products in the quality spectrum taking into account the qualities chosen by foreign rivals. The importance of this strategy is particularly evident in the rapidly expanding, knowledge intensive industries, such as pharmaceuticals and computer software. First, these industries often exhibit high up-front costs of product development with subsequent low variable costs of production. Also, firms tend to be oligopolistic because of limitations on entry due to this cost structure and an ability to patent. In such an environment, the particular features that differentiate products are the main determinants of success and a major focus of 1 competition is at the product development stage.
There are a number of possible motives for government policy targeted at product quality. In particular, regulations affecting quality, such as minimum quality standards, may simply be a response to the need for consumer protection due to asymmetric information about product quality. Such policies may also be a 2 means to protect domestic industry from import competition. Other motives, however, are needed to explain the existence of policies targeted at the quality of 3 exports. Taiwan, for example, has a long standing policy to influence the quality of exports through compulsory inspection of certain export items and the subsidization of quality control associations in some sectors (e.g., machine tools, heavy electrical machinery, umbrellas and toys, see Wade, 1990, 144) . Korea has also encouraged product quality improvement in some sectors, while, as part of the so called 'Northern strategy', it has also subsidized the marketing of certain low quality products, thus eliminating incentives to improve product quality (Ursacki and Vertinsky, 1994) . In Finland, the government subsidized product oriented R&D in paper production, offering incentives for climbing the product quality scale in an industry which was already a world leader in the production of high quality papers (Wilson et al., 1998) . Subsidies for product quality improvement in the newsprint industry have also been recommended in Canada, despite Canadian leadership in quality (see Binkley, 1993) .
There are various arguments as to why governments might want to raise the quality of exports when quality levels are low. For example, Taiwan may have imposed quality controls to avoid damage to the reputation of all its exports from 1 These features can be broadly interpreted as any attributes, including attributes of the production process (e.g. impacts of production on the environment) that consumers care about (see Inglehart, 1990) .
2 For example, the U.S. has long complained that Japanese regulations specifying detailed characteristics that particular products must satisfy are discriminatory against imports.
3 Quality upgrading of exports could be an indirect consequence of growth policies that generally target investment and R&D. Our concern is with policies that specifically target the quality of exports. the export of shoddy goods. There may also be a motive to improve the quality of exports so as to satisfy minimum quality standards in importing countries. However, these arguments do not explain why governments would subsidize quality improvements for firms that are already industry leaders in quality or even discourage the development of quality for their low-quality exporters.
This paper explores the implications of a 'strategic-trade policy' or 'rentshifting' motive for subsidy or tax policy applied to investments in quality 4 improvements for exported products . There are two countries, a developed country and an LDC (less developed country), each with one firm producing a quality differentiated good. To focus on strategic trade policy effects, we assume that the entire production is exported to a third country market on the basis of either Bertrand or Cournot competition. A feature of the model is asymmetry of investment costs across countries, reflecting the reduced opportunities for invest-5 ment in the LDC relative to the developed country . This cost difference is assumed to be sufficiently large that the firm in the LDC will produce a lower 6 quality product than does its developed country rival . However, even if investment costs are identical, policies differ sharply conditional on whether a country produces the high or low quality. As we show, under Bertrand competition, domestic welfare in the low-quality country is increased by a subsidy to investment, whereas the high-quality country gains from an investment tax. These policies are reversed under Cournot competition, with policy switching to a tax in the low-quality country and a subsidy in the high-quality country. As these results indicate, strategic-trade policy can explain why a country might intervene to raise the quality of low-quality exports, but it also shows that there are circumstances in which there is a motive for less obvious policies, such as a subsidy to a high-quality producer or a tax on quality development by a low-quality producer.
The model involves a three stage (full information) game in which governments act first to maximize domestic welfare by committing to subsidy or tax policy. If both countries intervene, there is a Nash equilibrium in subsidy and tax levels. Firms then commit to their levels of investment in quality and subsequently compete in quantities or prices. The structure follows Spencer and Brander (1983) , except that government policy affects positioning in product space, rather than 7 levels of cost-reducing investment or R&D for products that are fixed in nature . Since, in the current application, firms are constrained by the Nash assumption that they take the rival's quality as given, the strategic trade policy incentive is to set subsidy (or tax) policy towards domestic investment in quality so as to manipulate quality choices in such a way as to raise the domestic rents (profits less the cost of any subsidy) earned from exports.
We also explore the implications of coordinated policy choices by the two producing nations so as to maximize their joint welfare. With the elimination of the motive for rent-extraction from the rival firm, the aim is to increase the total profits extracted from third country consumers. Nevertheless, the appropriate policy direction for each country is not immediately obvious. For Bertrand competition, a move from the Nash policies to the jointly optimal policy causes a switch in policies for both countries, namely the LDC should tax rather than subsidize quality and the developed country should subsidize rather than tax quality. For Cournot competition, the jointly optimal policy involves taxes by both countries.
We use a standard model of vertical quality differentiation in which consumers purchase at most one unit of the differentiated product. The assumption that the costs of quality development are sunk prior to the determination of prices and 8 output is also well established in the literature. However, international trade theory has mostly concentrated on an alternative model, in which quality affects 9 variable production costs and there are no up-front investment or R&D costs. This international literature also differs because of its main focus on the effects of 10 domestic import restrictions on quality upgrading or downgrading. Finally, following the approach of Ronnen (1991) , we use analytical methods to develop our results for a significantly more general formulation of investment costs than is 11 typically found in the literature.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets out the structure of the game and the basic consumer preferences and costs underlying the model of quality choice. Section 3 investigates investment policy and quality choice under Bertrand 7 Policy towards cost-reducing investment differs, since it involves a subsidy under both Bertrand and Cournot competition (see Spencer and Brander, 1983; Bagwell and Staiger, 1994) . We refer to firms as investing in quality, but, this investment could also be interpreted as R&D expenditure aimed at improving quality.
8 See, for example, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) , Sutton (1982, 1983) , Ronnen (1991) , Motta (1993) , Aoki and Prussa (1997) and, in international trade, Herguera et al. (2000) . 9 Papers include Krishna (1987) , Bond (1988) , Donnenfeld (1987, 1989) and Ries (1993) . This model is often termed a 'variable cost of quality model', whereas the model with up-front investment costs is termed a 'fixed cost of quality model '. 10 There is also empirical work on quality upgrading (see, for example, Feenstra, 1988) . 11 Previous analysis has mostly modeled investment costs as simply depending on the square of quality and, particularly for the Cournot case, numerical values have been used to characterize equilibrium (see, for example, Motta, 1993; Herguera et al., 2000) . competition whereas Section 4 develops and contrasts the results for Cournot competition. Finally, Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
The basic model: consumer demand and costs
There are two firms, firm L, located in an LDC and firm H, in a developed country. Each firm produces a quality differentiated product, all of which is exported to a third country market. The game between firms involves a sub-game perfect equilibrium with two stages of decision. In stage 1, the quality of each product is determined at a Nash equilibrium in which each firm sets its investment in quality so as to maximize profit, taking the quality of the other firm as given. In stage 2, the products are sold on the basis of a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium if price is the decision variable or a Cournot-Nash equilibrium if quantity is the decision variable. This two-stage structure reflects the idea that price (or quantity) can be changed more easily than product quality, which is a longer term decision. Governments commit to policy towards investment at stage 0, prior to the game played by firms.
The asymmetry in investment costs across countries is reflected by the assumption that firm H, in the developed country, requires an investment F(q) to produce a product with quality q, whereas firm L, in the LDC, requires an investment of gF(q), where g $ 1. Otherwise, the two firms are identical for any given value of q. The investment cost, F(q), and the marginal investment cost, F9(q), are assumed to be strictly increasing in quality for all q [ (0,~]. Following Ronnen (1991) , for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, we also assume that F-(q) $ 0 and that F9(q) becomes infinite in the limit as q becomes very large. The total and marginal costs of the first unit of quality are assumed to be zero (i.e. F(0) 5 F9(0) 5 0) so as to make it profitable for both firms to enter. In 12 summary, we assume: :
q→À lso, to focus on investment decisions, we assume that marginal and average production costs per unit of quality are constant and, for simplicity, we let these 13 costs be zero.
If firms are identical (g 5 1 in our setting), Ronnen (1991) has shown that for Bertrand competition at stage two, conditions (1) are sufficient to ensure the 12 n a q
Two classes of functions satisfying (1) are F(q) 5 aq for n $ 2 and F(q) 5 q(e 2 1), where a . 0.
13 Our results apply if the total production cost for output x of quality q is C 5 cxq, where c $ 0 is constant.
existence of a unique global equilibrium with respect to the qualities produced of each product. However, the allocation of qualities across firms is indeterminate. Nevertheless, as we show in Zhou et al. (2000) , for both Bertrand and Cournot competition, we can address the case in which policy decisions are made knowing that the LDC will produce the lower quality product by assuming that g is sufficiently large. Consequently, letting superscripts L and H indicate variables associated with firms L and H respectively, the ratio of high to low quality is given H L by r ; q /q $ 1. Consumers vary based on a taste parameter for quality, denoted u, which is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of the i differentiated good and obtains a (linear) utility, uq , from consumption of quality
Since consumers pay a price, P , for quality q , the quality-
adjusted price is p ; P /q for q . 0 and consumer surplus for taste u can be and high quality goods, denoted by x and x respectively, are given by,
H H L x ; 1 2 u 5 1 2 (rp 2 p )/(r 2 1).
Investment policy and quality choice under Bertrand competition
Assuming prices are determined by Bertrand competition after firms have committed to quality, we develop the model of quality choice in subsection 3.1. Policies towards investment in quality are then investigated in 3.2 and 3.3 for the LDC and developed country respectively.
The two-stage model of firm behavior: Bertrand competition
As is standard in these models, we first examine the second stage equilibrium in which each firm sets its price to maximize its profit, taking the price of the other 14 There are no income effects since, implicitly, utility is assumed to be separable in a second homogeneous good. This homogeneous good also acts behind the scenes to achieve trade balance.
If r 5 1, then since p 5 p , the good is purchased for u [ ( p , 1] and x 5 (1 2 p )/2 for i 5 L, H. As we show, qualities always differ at the Nash equilibrium (see also Motta, 1993 to represent partial derivatives with respect to q and q respectively, we obtain
Since an increase in q and a reduction in q both increase the separation of H L products as measured by r 5 q /q , both firms enjoy higher revenue as the products become more differentiated. These higher revenues reflect the fact that greater product differentiation reduces price competition, leading to an increase in quality-adjusted prices (and a reduction in both outputs) at the Bertrand equilibrium (see (A.3)).
i
Turning to the determination of quality, we first define s to represent the proportion of the cost of investment in quality covered by a subsidy to firm i for 
Setting q to maximize p , taking q as given, and setting q to maximize p ,
L L
taking q as given, it follows from (4) that the Nash equilibrium qualities, q and In deciding on quality, the firms face two basic considerations. The first is the profitability of the location in quality space based on revenues and the cost of 17 i If s $ 1, then the cost of investment is zero or negative and quality would increase excessively.
investment in quality for a given distance from the rival's quality as measured by the quality ratio, r. The second is the effect of a change in the quality ratio, which L determines the degree of price competition. For firm L, since an increase in q H reduces the gap between the products (holding q fixed), the associated increase in price competition tends to limit the gain from an increase in quality.
L H
Nevertheless, firm L has an incentive to set q . 0 (for any q ) because the assumptions F(0) 5 0 and F9 (0) from (1) ensure that its marginal profit from a very low quality is always strictly positive. By contrast, the prospect of reduced price competition favors an increase in quality by firm H, but the extent of the increase is limited by the rising marginal cost of investment in quality.
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , since each firm's marginal revenue from own quality is H L increasing in the other firm's quality (i.e. R . 0 and R . 0), the reaction
functions, denoted q 5 r (q ) and q 5 r (q ) for firms H and L respectively, have positive slopes (see (A.8)), making the products strategic complements in L quality space. Since an increase in q raises price competition by reducing the gap H between qualities, firm H has an incentive to also raise q so as to help ease this H competition. Conversely, the reduced competition from an increase in q gives L firm L the room to raise q so as to better position its product. The second order and stability conditions ensure that firm L has a steeper reaction function than does firm H and hence that the curves cross at the unique Nash-equilibrium point
(shown as N). Since r 5 q /q . 1, the reaction functions both lie above the (dotted) 458 line.
LDC investment policy towards the low-quality product
We now turn to the effects of an LDC subsidy (or tax) set at stage 0, prior to L H investment in quality. Since the subsidies, s and s , by the LDC and developed country respectively are applied directly to investment and since investment costs are sunk at stage 1, there is no change in the second-stage price equilibrium for given levels of quality. As for the first stage quality game, the first order
conditions (5) 
Following Spencer and Brander (1983) , the LDC policy can be understood from raise q above the Nash-equilibrium level . It follows that for Nash behavior by firms in quality space, LDC welfare is maximized by a subsidy to investment so as L to achieve the same higher level of q . Fundamentally, the subsidy corrects for the
L * strictly concave in q and hence that W is locally concave at s . This concavity, together with a large L H g, ensures that the LDC does not attempt to leapfrog q above q (see Zhou et al., 2000) .
More formally, dp /dq
fact that, by taking q as given, firm L sets q too low due to its overestimate of L H L the increase in price competition from an increase in q . Since r 5 q /q falls, the subsidy actually makes the products more similar, causing quality
p and p , to fall, but firm L's revenue, R 5 p x q , nevertheless increases due to a higher volume of higher-quality exports (see Proposition 1(i)). Consequently, the LDC gains from a better positioning of its product in relation to consumer preferences as both firms move up the quality ladder. These results are illustrated in Fig. 2 . Starting from the Nash equilibrium at L * point N, the subsidy, s , shifts firm L's quality reaction function to the right (shown as the dashed line), resulting in a new Nash equilibrium at point S. There is a net increase in LDC profit at the expense of firm H and, as a result, the LDC moves to a higher iso-welfare contour (from L1 to L2) while the developed country, country H, moves to a lower iso-welfare contour (from H1 to H2). Since the contour L2, based on firm L's profits less the cost of the subsidy, is tangent to firm H's reaction function at S, point S also represents the outcome if firm L were a Stackelberg leader in quality space in the absence of a subsidy.
Developed country policy towards the high-quality product H
As set out in Proposition 2(i) below, an investment subsidy, s , set by country H also causes the quality of both products to rise. However, in contrast to the L H L effect of s , the quality ratio r ; q /q increases, making the products more H H differentiated. This difference arises because s directly raises q which raises r, These results are illustrated in Fig. 3 . Starting from the Nash equilibrium at H * point N, the tax, s , shifts down the reaction function of firm H (shown as the dashed line), resulting in a new Nash equilibrium at point S. As a result, the developed country moves to a higher iso-welfare contour (from H1 to H3) while the LDC moves to a lower iso-welfare contour (from L1 to L3). Since H3 is tangent to the reaction function of the LDC firm, point S also represents the 
. To ensure that s exists, we assume local concavity of W at s 5 s . As shown in Zhou et al. (2000) , letting E(q) ; qF0(q)/F9(q) represent the responsiveness (or elasticity) of F9(q) with respect to n q, this holds if E(q) . 0 is constant. If F(q) 5 aq , then E(q) 5 n 2 1 and the result applies for n $ 2. since country H would like to see a reduction in q , but the LDC subsidizes q , when both countries intervene, these unilateral incentives for policy tend to undermine the goal of raising profits from exports. As the above argument suggests, aggregate or joint welfare of the two producing countries can be increased if LDC policy is switched to a tax on investment in quality and developed country policy is switched to a subsidy. These joint policies, More formally, dp /dq 5 p 1 R (dq /dq ) , 0 at p 5 0.
on its rival's profit. Thus the gain to firm H from reduction in q favors an LDC H tax and the gain to firm L from an increase in q favors a subsidy in country H. In fact, as set out in Proposition 3, the policy in each country depends only on the cross effect of own quality on the other firm's revenue and on the own cost of increasing quality. Since the joint policies increase the quality gap between the products so as to reduce price competition in the third-country market, the joint gain to the producing countries is achieved at the expense of consumers, who pay 23 higher quality-adjusted prices and purchase lower quantities of both products. 
Investment policy and quality choice under Cournot competition
We now turn to the case of Cournot competition in which firms choose output levels at stage 2 after committing to quality levels at stage 1. The game played by firms is set out in 4.1 and the respective effects of LDC and developed country policies towards quality are explored in 4.2 and 4.3.
The two-stage model of firm behavior: Cournot competition
Since production costs are zero, at the second stage Cournot equilibrium, each Appendix B that equilibrium revenues, R (q , q ) and R (q , q ) for firm L and H respectively are both decreasing in the quality of the other firm: i.e.
R 5 2 2r /(4r 2 1) , 0, R 5 2 4(r) (2r 2 1) /(4r 2 1) , 0.
H L H L
Since an increase in q and a reduction in q both increase r, (6) shows that the revenues of the two firms respond in opposite directions with respect to a greater separation of products (holding own quality fixed), with firm L's revenue falling and firm H's revenue rising. Thus, in contrast with the Bertrand case, firm L now gains as the products become more similar, whereas firm H gains from a greater separation of products as before. These results can be understood by first examining the inverse demand
functions, p 5 1 2 (x 1 x ) and p 5 1 2 x /r 2 x (from (2)), which represent 23 L
The reduction in q due to the LDC tax may seem to suggest a broadening in market sales, but an increase in aggregate output, as measured by x 1 x , which tends to reduce prices, and in fact the quality-adjusted price of the low-quality good does fall. However, despite this pressure for lower prices, the quality-adjusted price of the L L high-quality product is increased: i.e. from (B.2), we obtain, dx / dr 5 dp /dr , 0
and dx /dr 5 dp /dr . 0. This increase in p can be explained due to the more than offsetting effect of the initial increase in consumer willingness to pay for high quality as the gap between qualities increases. Since quality-adjusted price and output both fall for firm L and both rise for firm H, it follows immediately that firm L's revenue must fall and firm H's revenue must rise as the products become 24 more differentiated. Now considering the stage 1 choice of quality, firms L and H earn respective profits given by:
Setting own quality to maximize own profit, taking the quality of the other firm as
L H
given, the Nash equilibrium qualities, q and q , satisfy the first order conditions:
As reflected in R . 0 (see (B.4)), the gain to firm L from a narrowing of the L L H quality gap gives it an incentive to increase q , which reduces r, holding q fixed. For firm H, analogously to Bertrand competition, a greater separation in qualities H raises revenue leading it to also want to raise q . However, for both firms, the profitability of an increase in quality is limited by the rising marginal cost of investment in quality. The second order and stability conditions (see (B.5)), are assumed to hold locally at the Nash equilibrium in qualities. However, satisfaction of these 24 Similar reasoning shows the contrast with Bertrand competition. By raising consumer willingness to pay, an increase in r causes firm H to raise price (taking the price of firm L as given) and firm L (i.e. dq /dq 5 2 R /P , 0).
LH LL

LDC investment policy towards the low-quality product
As set out in Proposition 4(i) for Cournot competition, an investment subsidy, L s , applied to firm L by the LDC raises the qualities of both products, but the 25 Zhou et al. (2000) use analytical methods to explore the restrictions on F(q) implied by the second order and stability conditions. These conditions hold locally for the commonly used cost function,
F(q) 5 q / 2 and also for E(q ) 5 q F0(q )/F9(q ) $ 2, which includes F(q) 5 aq for a . 0 and n $ 3. Stackelberg leader in quality, would reduce q below the Nash equilibrium level . Correspondingly, in a situation of Nash behavior in quality space, the LDC achieves the same choice of quality from its investment tax. Fundamentally the tax H L corrects for the fact that, taking q as given, firm L sets q too high due to its L overestimate of the extent to which the quality gap narrows as q is increased.
It is hard to prove that dP /ds . 0 (see (B.9)) because the increase in q due to s . 0 tends to reduce firm L's revenue, which partly offsets the effect of the subsidy in reducing firm L's costs for a Zhou et al. (2000) show that dW /(ds ) , 0 at s if E(q ) ; q F0(q )/F9(q ) $ 2 and 2 n a q
More formally, for Cournot competition, dP /dq 5 P 1 R (dq /dq ) , 0 at P 5 0. As illustrated in Fig. 5 , the LDC tax shifts the quality reaction function of firm L in towards the origin (shown by the dashed line) and both countries move to higher iso-welfare contours. The tax reduces firm L's profit (see Proposition 4(i)(b)), but, taking into account the tax revenue, LDC welfare is nevertheless increased. Since H L r 5 q /q rises (see Proposition 4(i)(a)), the actual effect of the tax is to increase the difference between qualities, leading to a shift in consumer spending towards
the higher-quality product ( p and x rise and p and x fall). This benefits firm H, but the revenue and profit of firm L fall. Consequently (similar to the gain to country H from its tax under Bertrand competition), the benefit of the tax to the LDC arises from the savings in the cost of investment in quality. With respect to the question as to why a switch from Bertrand to Cournot competition causes LDC policy to switch from an investment subsidy to an H investment tax, it is useful to first point out that, since firm H raises q in response L H to an increase in q under both forms of competition and since firm L takes q as given at the Nash quality equilibrium, both cases involve an overestimate by firm L L as to the effect of an increase in q in making the products more similar. 
As illustrated in Fig. 6 , the subsidy, s , shifts up the quality reaction function of products and q falls as q is increased, the Stackelberg outcome involves an H increase in q above the Nash equilibrium level, leading to the gain from an investment subsidy. The investment subsidy corrects for the fact that, at the Nash equilibrium in quality space, firm H underestimates the extent to which products H become more differentiated as q is increased. The effect of the subsidy is to widen the quality gap, leading to an increase in the revenue of firm H, due to a
shift in consumer spending towards the high-quality good ( p , x and q all rise, L L but p and x fall from Proposition 5(i)). Finally, as in the Bertrand case, the jointly optimal investment policy differs from unilateral policy by taking into account the cross effects of the quality chosen by each firm on its rival's profit. Since firm H gains from the widening of the L quality gap due to a reduction in q and firm L gains from the narrowing of the H quality gap due to a reduction in q , joint profit maximization involves a move by both firms down the quality ladder. Consequently, as shown in Proposition 6, the policy requires that each country tax investment. Relative to the Nash-policy equilibrium, the joint choice of policies increases the investment tax in the LDC and results in a switch from a subsidy to a tax in the developed country. These 30 joint policies have an ambiguous effect on the size of the quality gap . Also, a H L change in the quality gap has mixed effects on prices ( p rises and p falls as r is increased). Thus, in contrast to the Bertrand case, there is no clear relationship between the size of the quality gap and the ability to raise prices at the expense of third country consumers. This suggests that the source of the joint producer gain from coordinated policy under Cournot competition is primarily due to the saving in investment costs as both firms move down the quality ladder. 
Conclusion
This paper develops the implications of strategic trade theory for policies targeted at the quality of exports. The analysis involves a three-stage game in which an LDC and a developed country attempt to reposition their firms in product 30 
H L
The effect of the joint policy on r 5 q /q depends on F0(q) and the efficiency gap, g. quality space through taxes and subsidies on investment. The two firms (one in each country) first make an investment determining the quality of their product and then compete on the basis of either Bertrand or Cournot competition in a third country export market. There are two basic considerations in determining the profitability of a particular location in quality space. First, for a given difference between own quality and the quality of the rival firm, there is the profitability of the location based on revenue and the investment costs required to reach that quality. Higher quality products tend to command higher revenues, but this tends to be offset by the fact that the cost of investment in quality is increasing at an increasing rate. The second consideration is the extent of the difference or gap between the quality of the two products, but the role played by this gap differs depending on the nature of product market competition. For Bertrand competition, a greater difference in qualities relaxes price competition, raising the profits of both firms, whereas, for Cournot competition, the profits of firm H increase as before, but firm H also raises output, leading to a reduction in the output, price and profits of firm L. Consequently, firm H gains from a greater difference in qualities under both forms of competition, whereas firm L gains in the Bertrand case but not the Cournot case. Related L H reasoning shows that firm H responds to an increase in q by also raising q under L both forms of competition and that firm L raises q in response to an increase in H q under Bertrand competition, but does the opposite under Cournot competition. These differences in incentives towards a greater separation of products and with respect to the direction of response to an increase in the rival's quality are at the heart of the explanation for the opposing policy prescriptions arising under the two market structures. For the LDC, unilateral policy involves a subsidy to investment in quality under Bertrand competition and a tax under Cournot competition. At the Nash equilibrium in qualities, each firm takes its rival's quality as fixed, but since under both Bertrand and Cournot competition, firm H responds to an increase in firm L's quality by also increasing quality, firm L overestimates the extent to which the quality gap will narrow as it raises its quality. In the Bertrand case, since firm L's profits are increasing in the quality gap, this causes firm L to position its product too low on the quality ladder. By contrast, in the Cournot case, firm L is better off as the quality gap narrows and it sets its quality too high. Consequently, LDC policy involves an investment subsidy so as to move firm L (and hence firm H ) up the quality ladder in the Bertrand case and an investment tax so as to move firm L (and firm H ) down the quality ladder in the Cournot case. Since under Bertrand competition, the LDC subsidy hurts firm H, this fits with the typical strategic trade story in which the gain to one country is at least partly at the expense of the rival foreign firm. However, it is interesting that this conflict does not apply for Cournot competition, since the tax by the LDC actually raises the profits of firm H and hence welfare in the developed country.
For the developed country, unilateral policy is reversed, with a tax on Producing countries may also coordinate their policies so as to maximize joint profits. For Bertrand competition, a coordinated strategy involves a widening of the quality gap between the LDC and the developed country as a means of reducing price competition in the third country market. Thus the LDC would tax its firm while the developed country would subsidize its firm. Under Cournot competition, since each firm gains from a move of its rival down the quality ladder (narrowing the quality gap for firm L and widening it for firm H ), both governments tax quality. Consequently, a main source of the joint gain is a saving in the costs of investment by both firms. For both Bertrand and Cournot competition, a joint welfare maximizing strategy shifts the focus of government policy from attempting to enhance domestic welfare by modifying the behavior of the firm in the other country, to also modifying the behavior of its own firm so as to enhance the profit of the firm in the other country.
) from (2), it follows, using ≠u / ≠p 521/(r21) and ≠u / ≠p 5r
r ; q /q , that p and p satisfy the first order conditions:
Letting V ; (≠ R /(≠p ) )(≠ R /(≠p ) ) 2 (≠ R /(≠p )(≠p )) , the second order and stability conditions are also satisfied:
olving (A.1), we obtain p 5 (r 2 1) /(4r 2 1), p 5 2p and u 5 (2r 2 1) /(4r 2 L H L 1). Since x 5 r /(4r 2 1) and x 5 2x (from (2)), it then follows that H L 2 dp /dr 5 2(dp /dr) 5 6/(4r 2 1) . 0,
Since p x 5 p x / 4, letting w(r) ; p x 5 p x /4 5 r(r 2 1) /(4r 2 1) , revenues can be expressed as:
where w9(r) 5 (2r 1 1) /(4r 2 1) . 0 and w0(r) 5 2 2(8r 1 7) /(4r 2 1) , 0. From (A.4), we have
R 5 4(w(r) 1 rw9(r)) 5 4r(4(r) 2 3r 1 2) /(4r 2 1) . 0. 
and hence, letting D ; p p 2 p p , we obtain
LL HH
Since the allocation of qualities to firms is determinate (the LDC firm produces the low-quality good), it follows from (A.6) and (A.7) that the equilibrium is unique and globally stable. The slopes of the reaction functions in quality space are given by: we also obtain dr /dq
hence dr /ds 5 (dr /dq )(dq /ds ) , 0. It then follows, using (A.3), that dp / 
(ii) Setting s to maximize W ; p 2 s gF(q ), it follows, using (
dW /ds 5 (dp /dq )(dq /ds ) for dp / dq 5 dp (q , r (q ), 0) / dq and
where q 5 r (q ; s ). This is demonstrated in Zhou et al. (2000) . h
A.4. Proof of Proposition 2 (i)(a) Totally differentiating (5), it follows, using (A.6), (A.7) and (3), that
q , (A.8) and (A.6), we also obtain dr /dq 5 (1 2 r(dq
s )gF0(q )/p q . 0 and hence dr /ds 5 (dr /dq )(dq /ds ) . 0. It then fol- using (A.3) , that dp /ds . 0 and dx /ds , 0 for
From (4) and (5), using (3) and part (i)(a), we also obtain:
To prove dp /ds . 0, from (A.10), using dq /ds 5 2
part (i)(a) and R 5 2 R /r), we first obtain dp /ds 5 2
this implies dp /ds 5 2 
, we obtain T 9(q) 5 2F(q)F-(q) $ 0 and since T(0) 5 0, we have T(q) $ 0 and Z . 0. 
(4) and p 5 0 from (5), it then follows that dW /ds 5 R (dq /ds ) 2
Using R , 0 and R . 0 from (3), we then obtain s 5 R /gF9(q ) , 0 and
Since each firm i sets x to maximize its revenue
the output of the other firm as given, it follows, using p 5 1 2 (x 1 x ) and
The second order and stability conditions (analogous to (A.2) dx /dr 5 dp /dr 5 2 1/(4r 2 1) , 0, H H 2 dx /dr 5 dp /dr 5 2/(4r 2 1) . Letting v(r) ; (r) /(4r 2 1) and c(r) 5 (2r 2 1) /(4r 2 1) , revenues can be
expressed as R (q , q ) 5 v(r)q and R (q , q ) 5 c(r)q . Using v9(r) 5 2 3 3 2r /(4r 2 1) , 0 and c9(r) 5 4(2r 2 1) /(4r 2 1) . 0, it follows that an increase in the rival's quality always reduces own revenue: i.e.
cL 3 R 5 v9(r) 5 2 2r /(4r 2 1) , 0,
R 5 2 (r) c9(r) 5 2 4(r) (2r 2 1) /(4r 2 1) , 0.
L Also, an increase in own quality always raises own revenue: i.e. Firm i for i 5 L, H sets q to maximize profit, P , as in (7), leading to first order
. R for all q $ q . 0. Setting q 5 q in P and recalling that g is large,
we obtain P 5 R 2 (1 2 s )F9(q ) . R 2 g(1 2 s )F9(q ) and hence P . 
ds 5 (dx /dr)(dr /ds ) 5 dp /ds . 0, dx /ds 5 dp /ds , 0 and d(x 1 x ) / L ds , 0. (b) From (7), first order conditions (8), (B.3) and part (i)(a), we obtain:
To prove dP /ds . 0, from (B.9), using dq /ds 5 2grR
(from part (i)(a) and R 5 2 rR ), we first obtain dP /ds 5 
and dq /ds 5 F9(q )R /D , 0. Since dr / dq 5 2 (1 2 s )gF0(q )/q P . ds 5 (dx /dr)(dr /ds ) 5 dp /ds , 0 and dx /ds 5 dp /ds . 
